Emanuela Ceva – Pluralism

Pluralism – Ceva

1. The category of pluralism is hard to catch for obvious reasons: Ceva thinks about it in two ways, moral and political.
2. Moral pluralism is a theory on the structure of morality that could be plural, distinct, and irreducible value or it could be monistic (everything could be reduced to one “super-value”, like maximization of someone’s profit). What happens on a different scale? ndM
3. Avoid Akrasia: the weakness of will, which could result in choices sub-optimal for us ndM
4. Ceva tries to interpret pluralism in a political sense, to evaluate its significations.
5. Political pluralism can emerge – within a society – for metaethical reasons (world of values is inherently plural), epistemological reasons (our reason is such that have multiple values) or just be taken as a fact.
6. In a society with plural moral views, people chase different goals in life, and they sometimes concur to get the same resources to get them. This is a source of conflict, and one question is: how society should handle the solution of these conflicts?
7. Other important questions: are every moral value “allowed”? why or, why not? And how a social order is justifiable?
8. One-point Ceva points out and that is important: the justification is not strategic, but the fundamental and basic requirement to any liberal approach in justice and politics. The more diverse (or big – scale) is the society, it gets harder or easier to find a justification? Why? ndM
9. Political theory could not exist if the members of a society would agree on what’s more important (as a value) politically: it’s the plurality of views that requires such questions (apparentily, liberalism fits well as an answer for the bigger the society. Is that why liberals want more diversity? ndM.)
10. Many possibilities for pluralism: liberalism first. Berlin says the amount and the nature of value is so diverse it cannot be put in order or ranked. This happens in every big society (ndM)
11. Larmore suggests abandoning Platonism: the concept that there’s just one answer, that can be reached by different perspectives.
12. Dworking seems to see that all the fights in the political arena are driven not by different values, but different interpretations of the same value (liberty)
13. Value pluralists see values as embodies of different versions of the same truth, which lead to different values.
14. Value pluralism is different from relativism: value pluralist believes that although sources of values are many, there is an inherently common human nature, that is common to all different and conflicting values and defines minimal morality, which then allows what are the values that can be accepted or not. (I believe this view is true. If this wasn’t true, societies bigger that the family could not exist ndM)
15. Kekes seems to believe that the recognition of plurality of mutual irreducible values implies the recognition of validity and objectivity of the truth claims (open to relativism. But is it true? Do we really believe every moral position Is legitimate? Just because we don’t rebel doesn’t mean we recognize them as legitimate ndM); plurality of standards, plurality of contextual forms of life; therefore, the need to devise a political arrangement tolerant and compatible of plurality (this has been a need when you scale up the concept of a society: the only way we subject ourselves to bigger groups is that somehow we have a possibility to concur to affirm our values as preeminent, or at least to defend them. A do ut des, where we exchange a more coherent form of association with the promise you can keep affirming your values. ndM)
16. What system can sustain pluralism better? Liberalism (Berlin and Galston)
17. Pluralism seems to be interconnected with liberalism: one must be able to follow a path of life he/she seems to value as worth it, and associate and leave groups he/she likes.
18. Liberalism – as a value – if understood as universal because of its ability to allow pluralism, it can reduce it: because is itself a moral view – priority to individual basic liberties – cannot claim any normative priority. In fact, liberalism is compatible with pluralism only if the latter is limited in scope. (can’t be against liberalism). Any value is non compatible with pluralism, but the larger the society the more needed is an approach that recognizes and protects pluralism. Is therefore impossible to find a comprehensive value, but all of them should tolerate pluralism. Which political values can do so? Federalism? ndM.
19. Gray doesn’t believe liberalism can be the only value, but philosophers should find a way on how to reconcile conflicts and find an arrangement within a society. All to maintain a modus vivendi.
20. Modus vivendi is not only a balance of power to maintain peace but share common minimal moral views that allows recognized institutions to reduce and regulate conflicts.
21. Is modus vivendi more compatible with pluralism than liberalism? It depends on how think are our ideas of pluralism. If you want to stay away from relativism, you should acknowledge some sort of common values (human dignity, for example) and therefore a normative approach should remember this.
22. Reasonable Pluralism (john Rawls) and political liberalism: reasonable pluralism is what we find in democratic liberal societies: values are plural because that’s the result of human reason and they should be allowed in a framework. It is a value that comes from reason and has the burden of judgement.
23. Rawls understanding of pluralism is not metaethical like Berlin:  value pluralism is a thesis on nature of values, while reasonable pluralism is on the nature of human judgment.
24. Burden of judgment has implication: axiological (different judgment of what is a good life), anthropological (a plurality of doctrines informs human life) and political (institutions are justified by reasons and recognize different values in a society)
25. The glue that keeps together a society is not liberalism, but reasonable pluralism – says Rawls. In a well-ordered society, political values have priority over private ones (eg. Religious ones. So, the ones at smaller scales? ndM) and among political values basic liberties (freedom of conscience) comes before equality of opportunity.
26. How can people distinguish between political and personal? And Rawls thinks that political debate is easier to solve than the ones who involve comprehensive values. This is debatable: what about abortion? Rawls knows that people have different understandings of the weight to put in different basic civil liberties: in this case, he thinks we should vote.
27. Reasonable pluralism is political, strictu sensu (ndM). The requisite is that all people have reason, and that we share.
28.  Public reason – as identified by Rawls – includes a set of political values common to a family of liberal form of justice. In fact, Rawls tries to enhance the consensus around basic values by having political values debated, summarizing values in that debate.
29. Conflict could emerge, but citizens have traceable proof of the debate and a way to solve it.
30. This idea of Rawls seems to allow only values debatable at a domestic version of pluralism. Rawls seems to have idealized normative presupposition about society. (he’s more a politician ndM)
31. Third interpretation of pluralism: the so-called actual pluralism. They don’t have any metaethical theory about values, they just think pluralism needs to be registered. Value conflicts are likely to arise: the commitment to what it is an actual circumstance of pluralism does not justify nor presuppose any meta-ethical stance more truthful to ethical experience.
32. People are reasonable and not: conflicts emerge, and we need a theory that speaks to all of them.
33. In absence of a story to tell as regards the sources of plurality or conflicts, why should a theory of justice respond to them all? Plurality of values and conflicts arise and are hard to avoid. They don’t’ have metaethical connotations, they are just a feature of political life.
34. Actual Pluralism: The term “actual pluralism” usually refers to the factual existence of a wide array of views, beliefs, and practices within a society or community. It can involve a variety of religious, cultural, ethical, and social perspectives and habits of life. Actual pluralism is often seen as a description of the empirical realities of a diverse society, and it can serve as the basis for arguments for how society should be structured to accommodate this diversity, such as through pluralistic legal or educational systems.
35. Value Pluralism: Value pluralism, on the other hand, is a philosophical concept often associated with Isaiah Berlin. It posits that multiple values, principles, or ways of life may be inherently conflicting yet equally valid. For example, the values of individual liberty and social equality may be in conflict but are both worthwhile. The notion of value pluralism suggests that these values cannot be ranked in any objective way that is true for all people, and thus, there will always be a need for trade-offs or compromises.

• Differences: Descriptive vs. Normative: Actual pluralism is often a descriptive term, signifying what exists in reality. Value pluralism is more normative, making a statement about how different values ought to be regarded.
• Scope: Actual pluralism can include a wide array of things, from religious beliefs to social practices to political views. Value pluralism is specifically focused on moral and ethical values.
• Practical Application: Actual pluralism often leads to discussions about how societies should be structured to accommodate diversity (e.g., laws, governance structures, education). Value pluralism, while it may inform these discussions, primarily leads to debates about how to resolve conflicts between different values or ethical principles.
• Assumptions: Actual pluralism often starts with the assumption that diversity exists and then asks what should be done about it. Value pluralism starts with the philosophical position that it is impossible or at least very difficult to rank different values or moral principles in a hierarchy.
• Conflict: Actual pluralism doesn’t necessarily imply conflict; diverse beliefs and values can coexist peacefully. Value pluralism starts with the assumption that values are often in conflict, necessitating trade-offs.
• Objective Truth: Actual pluralism doesn’t inherently make a statement about whether there is an “objective” or “best” way of doing things. Value pluralism posits that there is no single “correct” hierarchy of values applicable to all individuals or cultures.
• Ethical Implications: Actual pluralism may not carry ethical implications—it can merely be an observation of fact. Value pluralism often challenges monistic theories of value, suggesting that ethical dilemmas are often not resolvable through the application of a single principle.
• Understanding these terms and their differences can be vital when discussing societal structure, ethical theories, and the complexities of human values and beliefs