Autore: Matteo Callegari

Il conflitto tra individui – o gruppi di individui – è antico quanto l’umanità.

Fonte di tragedie in taluni casi (guerre), e/o di nuove modalità di equilibrio in altri (compromessi), il conflitto rappresenta le fondamenta dellan necessità politica. E’ dal conflitto, infatti, che la politica deriva la sua caratteristica più distintiva: rendere possibile l’utilizzo della forza in maniera legittima alll’interno di una società, grande o piccola che sia.

In queste brevi riflessioni, analizzeremo il tema del conflitto e del suo rapporto con la legittimità dell’uso della forza.

L’analisi riguarderà il pensiero di alcuni filosofi sul tema, in particolare su queste direttrici:

• Le origini del conflitto
  • Interessi diversi
  • Il pluralismo e i disaccordi
• Il conflitto e la politica
  • La politica è conflitto
  • Il conflitto è un valore?
• La risoluzione dei conflitti
  • Equità, compromesso e “teoria positiva” del conflitto
  • Imparzialità e parzialità
• Conflitto, scontro e armonia
  • Politica e violenza
  • L’assenza di conflitti. Utopia o distopia?

Making sense of moral conflict – Lukes

1. What is moral conflict? How does it make sense, and how we should treat it when it emerges? We should eliminate it, deal with it, it is real.
2. For Aristotle, “conflicting moral beliefs as a mark of ignorance, never as a recognition of conflicting moral requirements, while Aquinas further thought that the moral virtues formed a harmonious unity and could not exclude one another”.
3. For Kantians, “”when moral theories of this monistic sort have run up against recalcitrant moral intuitions that conflict with their favored higher order principle, they have too often resorted to the tactic of denying those intuitions their very status as ‘moral’ ones”.
4. Relativism tries to solve the problem of moral conflict, by stating that any value has legitimacy, and it is acceptable in its own place. (The problem is that it doesn’t get the scale: it depends at what level the conflict is established, and to enforce relativism you have to give up to his first principle: each value is legitimate in its own place, except the one I establish in this sentence, which is universal. This Is a version that could apply to a liberalism enforced to a higher scale, but at least doesn’t pretend to be otherwise NdM).
5. What are the possible forms of moral conflict?
6. “Conflicting moral claims or requirements that face agents, individual or collective, not with how to reconcile or regulate interpersonal or social conflicts between individuals, between individuals and groups and communities, or between groups and communities. Moral conflicts are conflicts between moral claims that may face persons or groups or communities or governments representing them, when individually or collectively they deliberate about what to do”.
7. What are the sources of conflict? Conflict may arise from moral obligations; between the actions they require within a certain situation.
8. Secondly, we can find conflict coming from different purposes, ends, or (vague) “values”. For example, should we promote democracy in any case, even at the cost of individual freedom?
9. “Technical progress cannot co-exist with absolute security of living conditions for everyone. Conflicts inevitably arise between freedom and equality, planning and the autonomy of small groups, economic democracy and efficient management, and these conflicts can always be mitigated by compromise and partial solutions”.
10. How can we reduce conflict that comes from technological advancement? What scale should we use to solve it? The underlying value is always that advancement are good for the society as a whole, and there’s no way to stop it on a smaller level ndM.
11. “Thirdly, there are even more holistic and less well-defined entities between which moral conflicts may be thought to hold: moral codes or systems or world views or, in Rawls’s phrase, “conceptions of the good.”
12. “Conflicts of this sort are marked by incompatibilities of perception and belief, over “how good and evil are to be recognized and distinguished from each other. ” Such cultural differences of moral perception can certainly seem real enough. As Kolakowski remarks, they cannot be removed by retreating to some common ground which the adversaries share or by appealing, as in science, to some “higher tribunal” capable of an intersubjective adjudication of controversies.
13. Conflicts between different kinds of moral claims.
14. Several writers have pointed to the irreconcilability of the conflict between consequentialism and deontology, and I have already referred to the way in which utilitarians (who embody the dominant form of consequentialism in Anglo Saxon cultures) and Kantians seek to deny its very existence. Consequentialism requires that the agent maximize the overall good (on some interpretation of that good) , by so acting as to produce the best outcome, all things considered, for all those affected by this action.
15. We can add another one, conflict between different scales of groups, where each one of them will claim their autonomy to rule under a certain group. The higher the scale, the more liberal the value of the group should be in order to justify its existence, and that’s a point that needs to be stressed out ndM.
16. The view of Machiavelli: while the act accuses, the result excuses”. Can the resolution of conflict be justified by the results?
17. “For utilitarians and some other consequentialists (among whom I include Marxists, for reasons mentioned later) such dilemmas cannot exist, if the appropriate calculations for measuring the best overall outcome, all things considered, have been correctly made.”
18. “Conflict may signify diversity, incompatibility, or incommensurability”.
19. Diversity could be diversity of morals: in such cases-as opposed, say, to our contemplation of Athenian democracy or life among the Incas-conflict involves a more or less deep but relevant difference of lifeworld and lifestyle, that may be responded to in various ways. Among these ways are rejection, conversion, and various kinds of syncretistic adaptation. Not all moral diversity, in short, is conflictual. Nor does all conflictual diversity issue in incompatible ways of living.
20. Incompatibility: Antigone cannot both obey the dictates of family loyalty by burying Polynices and those of the law decreed by Creon. Agamemnon at Aulis cannot save both his fleet and his daughter. Sartre’s pupil cannot both join the Free French and console his mother.
21. Buried very deep in our philosophical consciousness and implicit in our social scientific practice is the nearly universal presumption that consistency of preference and of ethical beliefs is a mark of our rationality. But is it?
22. Incommensurability: Incompatible moral claims become incommensurable when the trade-offs become unavailable because there is no “comon currency
23. If the claims of two (or more than two) types of liberty prove incompatible in a particular case, and if this is an instance of the clash of values at once absolute and incommensurable, it is better to face this intellectually uncomfortable fact than to ignore it, or automatically attribute it to some deficiency on our part which could be eliminated by an increase in skill or knowledge; or, what is worse still, suppress one of the competing values altogether by pretending that it is identical with its rival-and so end by distorting both.
24. Lukes tried to discredit various attempts to make nonsense of such conflicts, and by suggesting our moral experience bears witness to their presence and to their importance.
25. There are two ways of taking the sting out of incompatibility: One is to deny its reality via theodicy: by believing, as Bishop Butler did, that God has so arranged the world and our natures that, though in acting morally we may appear to follow divergent moral principles that exclude general benevolence, nevertheless, sub specie aeternitatis, the general happiness is secured.
26. The other is to deny its necessity via the secular inheritance of theodicy: moral utopianism. A moral utopian believes that there is in prospect a perfect world in which all actual moral incompatibilities will be overcome because the subjective and objective conditions of life will render them impossible, even inconceivable (Marxist are in this category ndM).
27. As Weber, “speaking directly,” memorably put it “the ultimately possible attitudes towards life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion. Thus, it is necessary to make a decisive choice. ” What man, he asks, “will take upon himself the attempt to ‘refute scientifically’ the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount? For instance, the sentence ‘resist no evil, ‘ or the image of turning the other cheek?
28. Values are not discovered by reason, and it is fruitless to seek them, to find the truth or the good life, ” that “producing values and believing in them are acts of the will.
29. Many of the commitments, loyalties, and obligations that we have to relationships and activities that matter to us consist in part in a refusal to engage in the very kind of tradeoff that full commensurability would require.
30. If all this is right, then we can only conclude that modernity-in which the separation between the partial and the universal, like that between fact and value, has become a prevalent cultural fact-renders incommensurability inescapable.
31. What about liberalism? The case for religious toleration was central to its development; and out of that there developed the crucial but complex thought that civil society is an arena of conflicts, which should be coordinated and regulated by the constitutional state.
32. This has led critics of liberalism to condemn it for being anemic, pale, morally half-hearted, skeptical, even indifferent (it’s a mater of scale! We care less about the abstract, but in the abstract we can’t avoid discussing the themes liberalism brings to the table).
33. Rawls too distinguishes between “those that allow for a plurality of opposing and even incommensurable conceptions of the good and those that hold that there is but one conception of the good and which is to be recognized by all persons, so far as they are fully rational.
34. Allan Bloom, by contrast, while defending “liberal education,” is plainly a monist and a full subscriber to the “dominant tradition.” I doubt that there could be a more devout form of adherence to that tradition than the Straussianism he has so successfully popularized.
35. For him, the Rawlsian defense of liberalism is nothing short of a plea for moral indifference and skepticism, even “value-relativism. “
36. Diversity naturally arises from our limited powers and distinct perspectives; it is unrealistic to suppose that all our differences are rooted solely in ignorance and perversity, or else in the rivalries that result from scarcity.
37. This raises the deep and difficult issue of specifying just what sense liberalism is to make of moral, and more generally value, conflicts.
38. Some, most obviously some religious conflicts, cannot be resolved, because their justification seems to be internal all the way down: what is to count as good or overriding reasons remains to the end internal to the opposed parties and not susceptible to common or public argument.

Pluralism – Ceva

1. The category of pluralism is hard to catch for obvious reasons: Ceva thinks about it in two ways, moral and political.
2. Moral pluralism is a theory on the structure of morality that could be plural, distinct, and irreducible value or it could be monistic (everything could be reduced to one “super-value”, like maximization of someone’s profit). What happens on a different scale? ndM
3. Avoid Akrasia: the weakness of will, which could result in choices sub-optimal for us ndM
4. Ceva tries to interpret pluralism in a political sense, to evaluate its significations.
5. Political pluralism can emerge – within a society – for metaethical reasons (world of values is inherently plural), epistemological reasons (our reason is such that have multiple values) or just be taken as a fact.
6. In a society with plural moral views, people chase different goals in life, and they sometimes concur to get the same resources to get them. This is a source of conflict, and one question is: how society should handle the solution of these conflicts?
7. Other important questions: are every moral value “allowed”? why or, why not? And how a social order is justifiable?
8. One-point Ceva points out and that is important: the justification is not strategic, but the fundamental and basic requirement to any liberal approach in justice and politics. The more diverse (or big – scale) is the society, it gets harder or easier to find a justification? Why? ndM
9. Political theory could not exist if the members of a society would agree on what’s more important (as a value) politically: it’s the plurality of views that requires such questions (apparentily, liberalism fits well as an answer for the bigger the society. Is that why liberals want more diversity? ndM.)
10. Many possibilities for pluralism: liberalism first. Berlin says the amount and the nature of value is so diverse it cannot be put in order or ranked. This happens in every big society (ndM)
11. Larmore suggests abandoning Platonism: the concept that there’s just one answer, that can be reached by different perspectives.
12. Dworking seems to see that all the fights in the political arena are driven not by different values, but different interpretations of the same value (liberty)
13. Value pluralists see values as embodies of different versions of the same truth, which lead to different values.
14. Value pluralism is different from relativism: value pluralist believes that although sources of values are many, there is an inherently common human nature, that is common to all different and conflicting values and defines minimal morality, which then allows what are the values that can be accepted or not. (I believe this view is true. If this wasn’t true, societies bigger that the family could not exist ndM)
15. Kekes seems to believe that the recognition of plurality of mutual irreducible values implies the recognition of validity and objectivity of the truth claims (open to relativism. But is it true? Do we really believe every moral position Is legitimate? Just because we don’t rebel doesn’t mean we recognize them as legitimate ndM); plurality of standards, plurality of contextual forms of life; therefore, the need to devise a political arrangement tolerant and compatible of plurality (this has been a need when you scale up the concept of a society: the only way we subject ourselves to bigger groups is that somehow we have a possibility to concur to affirm our values as preeminent, or at least to defend them. A do ut des, where we exchange a more coherent form of association with the promise you can keep affirming your values. ndM)
16. What system can sustain pluralism better? Liberalism (Berlin and Galston)
17. Pluralism seems to be interconnected with liberalism: one must be able to follow a path of life he/she seems to value as worth it, and associate and leave groups he/she likes.
18. Liberalism – as a value – if understood as universal because of its ability to allow pluralism, it can reduce it: because is itself a moral view – priority to individual basic liberties – cannot claim any normative priority. In fact, liberalism is compatible with pluralism only if the latter is limited in scope. (can’t be against liberalism). Any value is non compatible with pluralism, but the larger the society the more needed is an approach that recognizes and protects pluralism. Is therefore impossible to find a comprehensive value, but all of them should tolerate pluralism. Which political values can do so? Federalism? ndM.
19. Gray doesn’t believe liberalism can be the only value, but philosophers should find a way on how to reconcile conflicts and find an arrangement within a society. All to maintain a modus vivendi.
20. Modus vivendi is not only a balance of power to maintain peace but share common minimal moral views that allows recognized institutions to reduce and regulate conflicts.
21. Is modus vivendi more compatible with pluralism than liberalism? It depends on how think are our ideas of pluralism. If you want to stay away from relativism, you should acknowledge some sort of common values (human dignity, for example) and therefore a normative approach should remember this.
22. Reasonable Pluralism (john Rawls) and political liberalism: reasonable pluralism is what we find in democratic liberal societies: values are plural because that’s the result of human reason and they should be allowed in a framework. It is a value that comes from reason and has the burden of judgement.
23. Rawls understanding of pluralism is not metaethical like Berlin:  value pluralism is a thesis on nature of values, while reasonable pluralism is on the nature of human judgment.
24. Burden of judgment has implication: axiological (different judgment of what is a good life), anthropological (a plurality of doctrines informs human life) and political (institutions are justified by reasons and recognize different values in a society)
25. The glue that keeps together a society is not liberalism, but reasonable pluralism – says Rawls. In a well-ordered society, political values have priority over private ones (eg. Religious ones. So, the ones at smaller scales? ndM) and among political values basic liberties (freedom of conscience) comes before equality of opportunity.
26. How can people distinguish between political and personal? And Rawls thinks that political debate is easier to solve than the ones who involve comprehensive values. This is debatable: what about abortion? Rawls knows that people have different understandings of the weight to put in different basic civil liberties: in this case, he thinks we should vote.
27. Reasonable pluralism is political, strictu sensu (ndM). The requisite is that all people have reason, and that we share.
28.  Public reason – as identified by Rawls – includes a set of political values common to a family of liberal form of justice. In fact, Rawls tries to enhance the consensus around basic values by having political values debated, summarizing values in that debate.
29. Conflict could emerge, but citizens have traceable proof of the debate and a way to solve it.
30. This idea of Rawls seems to allow only values debatable at a domestic version of pluralism. Rawls seems to have idealized normative presupposition about society. (he’s more a politician ndM)
31. Third interpretation of pluralism: the so-called actual pluralism. They don’t have any metaethical theory about values, they just think pluralism needs to be registered. Value conflicts are likely to arise: the commitment to what it is an actual circumstance of pluralism does not justify nor presuppose any meta-ethical stance more truthful to ethical experience.
32. People are reasonable and not: conflicts emerge, and we need a theory that speaks to all of them.
33. In absence of a story to tell as regards the sources of plurality or conflicts, why should a theory of justice respond to them all? Plurality of values and conflicts arise and are hard to avoid. They don’t’ have metaethical connotations, they are just a feature of political life.
34. Actual Pluralism: The term “actual pluralism” usually refers to the factual existence of a wide array of views, beliefs, and practices within a society or community. It can involve a variety of religious, cultural, ethical, and social perspectives and habits of life. Actual pluralism is often seen as a description of the empirical realities of a diverse society, and it can serve as the basis for arguments for how society should be structured to accommodate this diversity, such as through pluralistic legal or educational systems.
35. Value Pluralism: Value pluralism, on the other hand, is a philosophical concept often associated with Isaiah Berlin. It posits that multiple values, principles, or ways of life may be inherently conflicting yet equally valid. For example, the values of individual liberty and social equality may be in conflict but are both worthwhile. The notion of value pluralism suggests that these values cannot be ranked in any objective way that is true for all people, and thus, there will always be a need for trade-offs or compromises.

• Differences: Descriptive vs. Normative: Actual pluralism is often a descriptive term, signifying what exists in reality. Value pluralism is more normative, making a statement about how different values ought to be regarded.
• Scope: Actual pluralism can include a wide array of things, from religious beliefs to social practices to political views. Value pluralism is specifically focused on moral and ethical values.
• Practical Application: Actual pluralism often leads to discussions about how societies should be structured to accommodate diversity (e.g., laws, governance structures, education). Value pluralism, while it may inform these discussions, primarily leads to debates about how to resolve conflicts between different values or ethical principles.
• Assumptions: Actual pluralism often starts with the assumption that diversity exists and then asks what should be done about it. Value pluralism starts with the philosophical position that it is impossible or at least very difficult to rank different values or moral principles in a hierarchy.
• Conflict: Actual pluralism doesn’t necessarily imply conflict; diverse beliefs and values can coexist peacefully. Value pluralism starts with the assumption that values are often in conflict, necessitating trade-offs.
• Objective Truth: Actual pluralism doesn’t inherently make a statement about whether there is an “objective” or “best” way of doing things. Value pluralism posits that there is no single “correct” hierarchy of values applicable to all individuals or cultures.
• Ethical Implications: Actual pluralism may not carry ethical implications—it can merely be an observation of fact. Value pluralism often challenges monistic theories of value, suggesting that ethical dilemmas are often not resolvable through the application of a single principle.
• Understanding these terms and their differences can be vital when discussing societal structure, ethical theories, and the complexities of human values and beliefs

Compatibilità

In termini di volume degli investimenti, i primi tre trimestri del 2022 hanno rappresentato il miglior risultato di sempre registrato in Italia con 9,4mld €. Il 72% di questi volumi è stato attivato da operatori esteri, che confermano la fiducia nel nostro Paese.

Il quarto trimestre dell’anno ha visto però un rallentamento degli investimenti, causatodall’aumento dei costi del debito, dal contesto dei tassi di interesse e dalla pressione legata alla crescita dei prezzi energetici e dei materiali per le costruzioni. Nonostante ciò, per la fine dell’anno sono previsti volumi investiti superiori a 11 miliardi di euro – secondo miglior risultato di sempre – sottolineando l’attrattività del mercato immobiliare italiano.

In particolare, i settori finora trainanti sono stati gli uffici e la logistica, che fino al Q3 hanno rappresentato oltre il 60% del totale degli investimenti: rispettivamente €3,4mld per gli uffici e€2,6 mld per la logistica. Anche il settore retail ha segnato una forte ripresa nell’anno, nonostante risultino volumi ancora inferiori rispetto alla media degli ultimi 10 anni: nel Q3 gli investimenti sono stati pari a €470 mln. Il segmento hospitality con €1,3 mld registra un dato di quasi il 50%superiore al terzo trimestre del 2021. Per il residenziale, protagonista dell’anno scorso in Europa, volumi a €970 mln, raddoppiati rispetto all’anno scorso, ma ancora lontani dai livelli di investimento dei principali partner europei.

Il prossimo anno dovremo attenderci una contrazione dei volumi investiti, dovuta al rallentamento macroeconomico, al picco dell’inflazione e una probabile nuova crescita dei tassi di interesse. L’Italia però, continua a garantire buoni livelli di rendimento se paragonata ai partner europei, anche a causa del gap tra domanda e offerta di prodotto di qualità, contribuendo a generare buone aspettative di resilienza per il settore nel 2023.

Dal punto di vista macroeconomico, la Commissione UE prevede una crescita del PIL dello 0,3%per il 2023, con un tasso di inflazione in calo dall’8,7% del 2022 al 6,6% al termine del prossimo anno.

Il Piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza, che prevede dieci miliardi di euro dedicati alla Rigenerazione Urbana, individua correttamente una necessità per il prossimo anno. Il Piano non prevede però risorse dirette a favore dell’investimento immobiliare da parte dei privati. L’impatto sarà quindi indiretto, attraverso misure destinate a realizzare altri obiettivi – quali la digitalizzazione, la mobilità sostenibile o la produzione di energie rinnovabili. Da qui, l’esigenza per il nostro Paese di attrarre risorse finanziarie private significative per il rinnovamento dello stock immobiliare nazionale nei tempi e con le modalità previste dall’Ue, in particolare per quanto riguarda i capitali dei fondi pensione e dei fondi che investono il denaro del risparmio privato su scala sovranazionale.

Fonte: Elaborazione Confindustria Assoimmobiliare su fonti varie (2022)

I motivi del divario? Primum vivere deinde philosophari

Città vs. resto del mondo
Negli ultimi anni, le analisi che riguardano le elezioni generali (Presidenziali e Parlamentari) in
un Paese, sottolineano una forte disparità tra le preferenze di voto su base geografica – centri
urbani vs. zone rurali.
Come mai gli abitanti delle città votano in maniera così diversa dalle persone che vivono in
provincia? Quali sono le caratteristiche che portano le persone ad esprimere pareri simili
tra loro?
Prendiamo come esempio le categorie politiche USA. Nelle città viene premiato il candidato
democratico, mentre nelle zone rurali il candidato repubblicano.
Parte 1 – Chi sono le persone che vivono in città
La popolazione delle città è comparabilmente più:

• Giovane;
• Istruita;
• Multietnica;
  delle persone che vivono in provincia.
  Chi va in città?
  Le città hanno una percentuale di persone nate e cresciute all’interno delle stesse molto più
  piccola rispetto alle provincie. Perché?
  Le persone emigrano verso la città per un motivo principale: il lavoro e le prospettive
  economiche. Non ci sono molti altri motivi per il quale una persona lascia la comunità dove è
  nato e cresciuto, se non quello di provare ad avere un reddito maggiore e/o cercare di avere
  “successo”.
  Il motivo per cui si va in città è perché i grandi “employer” sono lì: queste imprese sono più
  grandi rispetto a quelle in provincia e sono generalmente più efficienti (quindi pagano meglio).
  In città, università e imprese sono in linea continua
  La città è quindi attrattiva di persone che vogliono una carriera.
  Le persone che vivono in città vogliono quindi entrare, per sopravvivere, in una di queste
  imprese.
  Per entrarvici, hanno dovuto passare dall’università, Istituzione che certifica, al termine di un
  certo numero di corsi, un’acquisizione di competenze su uno o più temi. Per farlo, i professori
  spiegano agli studenti ciò che devono sapere e ne verificano l’acquisizione tramite un test.
  L’università è un’Istituzione di tipo top-down gerarchico (professore spiega, alunno ripete), di
  tipo chiuso (risposta giusta o sbagliata) e meritocratica (voti, da bocciato a 30).

Al termine del corso lo studente ottiene il certificato che gli servirà per offrirsi a qualcuna delle
imprese in città. Le imprese moderne 1 tengono particolarmente alle lauree, perché replicano
esattamente la struttura delle imprese stesse (top-down, chiuse, meritocratiche).
Le imprese sanno che il giovane ha dimostrato di imparare nozioni che gli sono state spiegate e
che ha portato a termine questa serie di task (compiti) nei tempi previsti. È quindi perfettamente
coerente con i bisogni delle stesse imprese.
Vendere il tempo per abbassare il rischio
Che cosa offre, oltre alle nozioni apprese all’università, la persona che cerca lavoro?
Il tempo. Le imprese “comprano” il tempo della persona, ovvero della sua disponibilità
giornaliera anche quando non hanno nulla da fargli fare.
In cambio, offrono un abbassamento del rischio di sopravvivenza: il salario mensile elimina la
volatilità di doversi preoccupare di fare soldi giorno per giorno, o contratto per contratto.
Da sempre in strutture gerarchiche
Le persone che vivono in città accettano quindi, per sopravvivere, di stare in una struttura
prevalentemente gerarchica.
Una volta all’interno di una di queste imprese si può fare “carriera”, ovvero superare vari
compiti che vengono assegnati e dimostrare di essere affidabili nel portarli a termine. Questo
permette di salire un “gradino” nella struttura aziendale.
La grandissima maggioranza delle persone in città vive quindi in questo tipo di struttura, cosa
che hanno fatto sin dall’inizio del loro percorso scolastico.
Parte 2- La priorità dei valori fa la differenza
Il modo in cui cerchiamo di sopravvivere (in che modo otteniamo il denaro che ci serve e quali
variabili lo governano) influisce pesantemente il modo in cui poi esprimiamo i nostri valori su
situazioni generali, ovvero i cosiddetti “valori” politici, (che esprimiamo nelle elezioni generali e
“distanti” da noi come quelle Parlamentari o Presidenziali).
La differenza delle “priorità”
Le persone all’interno di una struttura aziendale, ovvero la maggior parte delle persone in città,
percepiscono in maniera estremamente diversa ciò che è importante per la sopravvivenza
rispetto a chi, per esempio, deve guadagnarsi la vita giorno per giorno (piccole imprese e
negozi, professionisti, partite IVA, autonomi in generale), i quali sono comparabilmente in
maggior numero nei piccoli centri.
Tra questi due gruppi non esiste una “diversità” di valori, ma una differenza di priorità e di
“scala”.
Priorità non significa cosa è giusto fare per prima collettivamente: la priorità è intesa sui
valori che si affermano prima di altri, sempre in astratto.

1 L’università non è MAI stata un’Istituzione per trovare lavoro, lo è diventata da solo da 80/100 anni. Oggi replica i
processi aziendali. Ne parlerò in un’altra nota

Lo scontro culturale che non c’è
I valori sono molto più condivisi di quello che pensiamo.
Noi interagiamo ogni giorno e a qualsiasi livello con tantissime persone diverse, riuscendo nella
stragrande maggioranza delle volte ad accordarci con loro (cause legali, risse, furti e omicidi
sono un’eccezione, non la regola). Nel 99% dei casi il terreno di valori con cui ci approcciamo
agli altri è quindi comune.
Quando esiste un dibattito ideologico, ovvero su questioni più astratte e lontane dalla
quotidianità, sono le priorità a determinare le nostre posizioni, ovvero cosa riusciamo a
vedere chiaramente – legato alla nostra vita quotidiana – e cosa lasciamo indietro come meno
importante.
Questo è determinato dalla struttura della nostra vita, ovvero dal modo in cui sopravviviamo
ogni giorno. Le persone esprimono queste priorità in base a ciò che vivono su di sé.
È quindi sbagliato affermare che le grandi “guerre” politiche sono guidate principalmente da
diversi valori su cosa è giusto.
La distanza delle decisioni collettive è importante
Le differenze tra chi vive in una struttura fortemente gerarchica e chi vive maggiormente sul
“day by day” non sono, come detto, valoriali; ci si accorda e si comunica senza troppi problemi
ogni giorno.
Il problema è che questi valori non sono scalabili; se il livello cambia (singolo, famiglia,
comunità, fino all’ultimo – lo Stato centrale) cambiano le percezioni di priorità.
I principi espressi ad un alto livello e lontano dalla propria vita accentuano e mostrano
limpidamente questa diversa scala di priorità.
Il motivo del divario: Sopravvivenza e rischi diversi
La maggioranza delle persone che vivono in città vive in una struttura molto simile a quella
statale (indipendentemente se pubblico o privato), ovvero vengono richiesti compiti in cambio di
sicurezza (salario).
Le persone che vivono in queste strutture, quindi, sono è molto più sensibili alle qualità morali
e all’immagine dei capi da cui ricevono ordini, esattamente come all’interno di un’impresa dove
viene mal tollerato un capo che non appaia affidabile, di buonsenso e capace di prendere
decisioni per tutti. Viene replicato il meccanismo aziendale.
La qualità delle loro giornate è determinata dalla qualità dei capi, mentre il rischio di
sopravvivenza è azzerato (salario).
Gli “autonomi” invece vedono nella struttura gerarchica ultima (il Presidente dello Stato, Il
Parlamento) qualcosa di poco comprensibile (estranea alle sue attività giornaliere) e vedono
le decisioni collettive come un rischio per la loro sopravvivenza; per l’autonomo le interferenze
esterne sono sempre un aumento del rischio.
Non hanno la priorità di “scalare” valori morali (buonsenso, buona apparenza, capacità di
prendere decisioni collettive) a capi che non hanno nella loro vita di tutti i giorni.

La priorità dei valori è amplificata all’estremo dalle strutture in cui viviamo: per la maggioranza
delle persone che vivono in città, l’autonomia è già limitata nella loro vita ed è importante
avere un buon capo con obiettivi e una visione condivisibili, per le persone al di fuori di questi
processi le caratteristiche morali sono già incluse nella propria coscienza ed è più
importante mantenere la propria indipendenza.